Various papers have recently documented that distance matters in economic transactions. There are several reasons to believe it could matter in executive compensation as well, in the sense that CEO compensation may depend on how much geographically-close CEOs earn. These include: (i) the force of local labor market competition for CEOs; (ii) the effect of "leading firms" in the vicinity as suggested by the literature on social interaction; and (iii) envy among geographicallyclose CEOs endowed with relative-consumption preferences. In this paper, I first examine whether geography does matter for CEO compensation, and then explore the possible reasons for this relationship.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a variety of papers have documented that distance matters in economic transactions. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) , Huberman (2001) , and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that investors prefer to invest in the stock of geographically-close firms. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) show that mutual fund managers in the same city hold similar portfolios.
Butler (2008) finds that "local" investment banks have a competitive advantage over nonlocal banks in municipal bond underwriting, especially for high-risk and non-rated bonds. Malloy (2005) finds that analysts provide more accurate forecasts when they are geographically located
closer to the firms they analyze. Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan (2008) find that acquirer returns are significantly higher in geographically-proximate deals. John and Kadyrzhanova (2008) document a geographic clustering of firms with anti-takeover provisions. Kedia and Rajgopal (forthcoming) find that more stock options are granted to rank-and-file workers when a higher percentage of geographically-close firms grant more options. Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that, while small firms have to be located near their lenders due to the high cost of information acquisition, greater usage of information technology at banks has enabled small firms to borrow over greater distances.
commoner […] . Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near him […] ." 3 Thus, physical proximity can determine who is included in a reference group for comparison, making envy a channel through which geography affects executive compensation.
I find empirical evidence that strongly supports the hypothesis that CEO compensation is affected by geography. CEO compensation (salary and cash compensation) is positively and significantly related to the level of compensation of CEOs employed at firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer or 250-kilometer radius. 4 These results are obtained while controlling for other factors that have been found to affect CEO compensation, including CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, growth options, firm performance, and year and industry fixed effects. Several additional control variables are added to all regressions. Since CEO pay is typically benchmarked against that earned at industry peers of similar size (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, forthcoming), the regressions include the average compensation at similar-sized firms in the same industry. 5 To ensure that the results are not driven by differences in the cost of living, I use the ACCRA Cost of Living Index (from the Council for Community and Economic Research) for every locality in the sample. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. The results are robust to using a variety of alternative specifications, including the addition of corporate governance proxies, the use of log-transformed variables, and the use of state and firm fixed effects.
It is important to note that Compustat only reports the most recent headquarter location of each firm and assigns this location to every year in the dataset. Although headquarter relocations should only make it harder for me to find significance, I hand-collect the actual location of each firm in the sample (using 10Ks, IPO prospectuses, annual reports, and articles found using Factiva) to ensure that the regression results are based on the correct location in every year.
The coefficients on the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-close
CEOs are positive and significant in all specifications, generally at the 1% level. The results are also economically significant: for example, the main regression results suggest that a $1 increase in salary enjoyed by geographically-close CEOs in the previous year results in a $0.29 increase in CEO salary in the current year. The effect of geography on CEO salary and cash compensation is sizeable and tends to equal roughly 35% to 50% of the effect of industry peer compensation.
The three potential explanations for these results mentioned earlier are then examined.
First, I examine whether the results arise from the effect of local labor market competition, which would tend to raise the compensation of all CEOs in tight local labor markets and lower it in others. To test this, the sample is limited to companies that were part of the S&P 500 in the previous year. These are the largest and most prominent firms that compete in national or even global labor markets for their CEOs, so the compensation contracts for their CEOs should not be affected by the locations of the headquarters of these firms. But even for these firms, I find that geography affects CEO compensation. Since the effect of geography on compensation cannot be a local labor market effect for these firms, there is more going on here than can be explained solely by local competition for talent.
Second, the literature on social interaction suggests that CEO compensation at firms in a geographic area is influenced by the compensation policies of "leading firms" (rather than all firms) in the area, but the compensation policies of the leading firms themselves are not affected by those of other firms (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; and Kedia and Rajgopal, forthcoming) . To investigate this, I classify the top three firms based on sales or market value of equity in any locality as the "leading firms" in that locality. When the sample is restricted to these leading firms, the results turn out to be even stronger than the ones based on the entire sample.
That is, the compensation of CEOs at leading firms is strongly influenced by the average compensation of the CEOs of other firms in the vicinity. Furthermore, when the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs is replaced by the average compensation of the CEOs at these leading firms and these leading firms are subsequently excluded from the sample, the coefficients are substantially smaller rather than larger. That is, it does not appear that the leading firms in an area are exerting a stronger influence on the compensation of a CEO than the influence being exerted by the average compensation of CEOs in the vicinity. Both results are inconsistent with the "leading-firm effect."
The third possible explanation that I explore is relative status concerns or envy. The literature suggests that agents may care about what they earn relative to other agents due to fairness/equity considerations (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or envy (e.g., Foster, 1972 ) that is embedded in preferences (e.g., Robson, 2001) . 6 As noted before, these effects are strongest within reference groups, which include CEOs at similar-sized firms in the same industry and
CEOs at geographically-close firms. Thus, a CEO's concern with the compensation levels of other CEOs in the vicinity could induce him to negotiate with his board of directors for adjustments in his compensation, and this could cause geography to affect CEO compensation.
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The maintained hypothesis throughout is that CEOs possess some bargaining power in the determination of their compensation. 8 The effect of relative status concerns should be strongest the further the CEO's pay lies below that of geographically-proximate CEOs ceteris paribus. As an initial test of this hypothesis, I therefore regress the change in CEO compensation on the CEO's "compensation gap", the difference between the compensation of geographically-close CEOs and the CEO's own compensation, plus control variables. I find that the coefficient on the compensation gap is positive and significant, which supports the hypothesis that relative status concerns drive the effect of geography on CEO pay. Note that this result cannot be explained away as a mere "economic mean reversion" effect. The results indeed suggest that the CEO is catching up with the mean, but it is the pursuit of a mean that should be irrelevant.
It is important to check the robustness of the conclusion that a concern for relative consumption is the driving force behind the results. Even though the OLS regressions control for a variety of known factors that affect CEO compensation, one can never be completely sure that 6 The intuition that envy may play a role in compensation also comes from survey evidence. Solnick and Hemenway (1998) surveyed Harvard University graduate students in public health. The majority of those surveyed indicated that they would prefer a world in which they earned $50,000 and others $25,000 to a world in which they earned $100,000 and others $250,000. 7 Since the CEO's reference group also includes CEOs at firms of similar size and other firms in the same industry, I introduce compensation variables based on similar-sized industry peers as controls in the analyses. 8 For empirical evidence and discussions on this, see, for example, Lorsch and Maciver (1989) ; Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ; Baker and Gompers (2003); and Fahlenbrach (forthcoming) .
an omitted variable unrelated to envy is causing the compensation of all CEOs in a given geographic area to be similar. A related issue is endogeneity. Although I posit that the compensation of CEO i (dependent variable) is driven by the average compensation of all CEOs in the area (independent variable), the causality may also run the other way. To the extent that this is because the other CEOs in the area are envious of CEO i rather than routine compensation The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data and discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 includes robustness checks. Section 6 examines the alternative explanations for the effect of geography on CEO compensation. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
THE RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. The first strand is the literature on the various economic ramifications of distance. In most of the papers in this strand, distance matters because of informational advantages: information is more efficiently procured when distances are smaller (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Huberman, 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Stein, 2004, 2005; Malloy, 2005; Butler, 2008; and Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan, 2008) . This paper is part of a small group of papers in which distance matters for a different reason. 9 The average compensation of geographically-close CEOs affects CEO compensation because CEOs care about their wages relative to those of geographically-proximate CEOs in their reference group.
The second strand of the literature to which this paper is related contains papers on executive compensation. While part of this literature has focused on estimating and explaining the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1999; and Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) Lemmon and Naveen (forthcoming) show that competitive benchmarking using peer groups affects the level of CEO pay. Yermack (1997) , Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) , Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) explain the rise in executive 9 Another paper in this group is Kedia and Rajgopal (forthcoming), which attempts to explain why broad-based option plans are so prevalent. They argue that labor markets for rank-and-file employees are geographically segmented. To attract and retain such employees, firms examine the use of options at other firms in the local community with whom they compete for labor. Firms will thus be more inclined, for competitive reasons, to offer options if geographicallyclose firms offer options.
pay on the basis of an increase in managerial entrenchment. By contrast, this paper focuses on the effect of relative consumption preferences on executive pay.
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The third strand of the literature to which this paper is related consists of papers that examine how characteristics of managers -such as relative-consumption preferences that lead to envy -affect corporate policies and outcomes. 11 Envy has been studied extensively (see, e.g. Smith and Kim, 2007 for an overview). 12 Early contributions on the importance of relative position and social concerns in economics include Smith (1759) , Marx (1849), Veblen (1899) and Keynes (1930) . More recent theoretical contributions have used relative-consumption preferences to explain compressed wages (Frank, 1984; Lazear, 1989; and Levine, 1991), involuntary unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) , corporate socialism in investment (Goel and Thakor, 2005) , the effectiveness of tournaments (Grund and Sliwka, 2005) , and optimal worker contracts (Dur and Glazer, 2007) . However, empirical research on the subject is scarce, possibly because empirical proxies for envy or equity-seeking behavior are hard to find. Existing empirical evidence suggests that: workers are not paid their marginal products due to positional concerns (Frank, 1984) ; wage dispersion reduces (increases) turnover of administrators with relatively high (low) salaries (Pfeffer and Davis-Black, 1992) ; individuals care about their compensation relative to that of others (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998) (Puri and Robinson, 2007) ; and optimistic CEOs expect better future performance (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2007) . 12 Kant (1785) defines envy as follows: "Envy (livor) is a tendency to perceive with displeasure the good of others, although it in no way detracts from one's own […] ; it is however only an indirect, malevolent frame of mind, namely a disinclination to see our own good overshadowed by the good of others, because we take its measure not from its intrinsic worth, but by comparison with the good of others and then go on to symbolize that evaluation." Envy is common and experienced by most people regardless of their cultural background (e.g, Schoeck, 1969; Foster, 1972) . Even monkeys experience envy. Brosnan and De Waal (2003) report that in experiments, if one monkey received a grape, considered a superior food, the other often refused the cucumber or threw food out of the cage. If one received a reward for doing nothing, then 80% of the time the other declined to participate further.
Important for this paper is the general view in this literature that people do not envy everyone, but only those in their own reference groups (e.g., Thomas Acquinas, 1265 -1274 and Elster, 1991) .
This paper is the first to link relative-consumption preferences to the geography of CEO compensation.
METHODOLOGY, VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS, AND SAMPLE
This section first explains the methodology. It then explains how distances are calculated and defines "geographic closeness". Finally, the variables and the sample are described.
Methodology
To test whether the compensation of geographically-close CEOs affects CEO compensation, the following model is estimated:
where CEOcomp , is CEO i's compensation in period t; aveCEOgeoclose , is the average compensation of CEOs geographically-close to CEO i in period t-1; X is a matrix of control variables including the average compensation of CEOs at similar-sized industry peers, CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, growth options, firm performance, and proxies for local market conditions;
is an industry fixed effect (based on 17 Fama-French groupings); and is a year fixed effect.
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All of these variables are defined in Section 3.3. Note that aveCEOgeoclose is lagged relative to CEOcomp in part to deal with the endogeneity concerns discussed earlier. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported.
Geographic Proximity
I obtain the location (city) of the headquarters of every firm in the sample from Compustat.
Unfortunately, Compustat does not report a firm's actual location in each year, but backfills the data, i.e. it assigns the firm's most recent headquarter location to every year in the dataset. One could argue that headquarter relocations will only make it harder to find significance. Since it is 13 Similar results are obtained if state fixed effects are added or if firm fixed effects are used instead of industry fixed effects (see Section 5.4).
better to use the actual location in every year, however, this data was hand-collected from 10Ks, IPO prospectuses, firms' websites, and Factiva.
14 Each firm's actual headquarter location is then matched with latitude and longitude data from the Census 2000 U.S. Gazetteer. Compustat city names are checked to ensure that they correspond with the names found in the Gazetteer "places" files and are corrected when needed.
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In case a Compustat city name could not be found on the Gazetteer file (90 instances), I check the actual location of the city on maps.google.com and assign the observation to the nearest place that is on the Gazetteer file within a 15 kilometer radius of the original location.
The distance between cities is estimated using the Haversine formula. 16 Firms that are headquartered within a 100-kilometer or a 250-kilometer radius of the firm are defined as being 
Variable Descriptions
The dependent variable in all regressions is CEOcomp, the dollar amount of CEO compensation.
Results are qualitatively similar if a log specification is used instead (see Section 5.5). Three alternative definitions of compensation are used in the tests: salary, cash compensation, and total compensation. These variables are taken from ExecuComp (items: salary, total_curr, and tdc1, respectively). Salary is defined as the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation includes salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts, other compensation, restricted stock grants, and the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants.
The key independent variable in most regressions is aveCEOgeoclose i,t-1 , the average dollar amount of CEO compensation received in the previous year by CEOs that work at firms that 14 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Burch Keeley and Rimas Biliunas in collecting this data. 15 The Gazetteer "places" files contain "cityfips", five-digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) codes that uniquely identify "populated places," including cities, towns, boroughs, villages and census districts. 16 The haversine formula gives great-circle distances between two points on a sphere. The distance between cities 1 and 2 is calculated as d 12 = R × 2 × arcsin(min(1, sqrt(a))), where R is the earth's radius (approximately 6371 kilometers), a = (sin(dlat / 2)) 2 + cos(lat 1 ) × cos(lat 2 ) × (sin(dlon / 2)) 2 . In this expression, dlat = lat 2 − lat 1 and dlon = lon 2 − lon 1 . Lat 1 and lon 1 (lat 2 and lon 2 ) are the latitudes and longitudes of City 1 and City 2 , respectively. are "geographically close." 17 Geographic closeness is defined using the 100-kilometer and 250-kilometer cutoffs described in Section 3.2. Compensation is again measured as salary, cash compensation, and total compensation.
Executive compensation committees often use data on executive compensation at companies of similar size in the same industry to assess the competitiveness of the compensation packages awarded to top management at their firms (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, forthcoming). To ensure that the results are not merely driven by the compensation at similarsized industry peers, I create industry-size terciles (based on total assets) in each year and assign each firm to the appropriate peer group in that year. The average compensation in the appropriate industry-size group in the previous year is included in the regressions as a control variable.
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Age is a well-recognized determinant of compensation and has been shown to be significantly related with CEO pay (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; and Bognanno, 2001 ). I therefore control for the CEO's age in the regressions.
CEOs who have been in office longer may receive higher compensation because they are more reputable (e.g., Milbourn, 2003) or because longer tenure strengthens the CEO's ability to influence the board and hence, his compensation (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Baker and Gompers, 2003; and Fahlenbrach, forthcoming) . To capture this dimension of governance, CEO tenure, defined as the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO, is included in the regressions.
The CEO pay literature finds that compensation tends to be highly correlated with organization size and growth opportunities, presumably because it requires greater skill to manage a larger, more complex company with higher growth prospects (e.g., Rosen, 1982; and Smith and Watts, 1992) . Firm size and growth opportunities are therefore added as control variables. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Growth opportunities are measured by the firm's market-to-book (M/B) ratio, calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. 17 As indicated before, the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs does not include the CEO's own compensation in the prior year. 18 The average compensation at similar-sized industry peers excludes the CEO's own compensation in the prior year.
Agency theory suggests a positive relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979 salary, cash compensation, and total compensation.
The results in Panel A show that the coefficients on the average compensation of CEOs in a 100-kilometer radius are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the salary and cash compensation regressions (t-statistics of 6.25 and 6.14, respectively), and at the 10% level in The results permit a simple, albeit qualified, thought experiment: how would moving a firm's headquarter from a bottom-25 city (in terms of average compensation of geographicallyclose CEOs) to a top-25 city affect CEO compensation, ceteris paribus? The data suggest that if we were to move a company from say San Diego, CA (a bottom-25 city) to New York City (a top-25 city) in 2006, the CEO's salary would improve by 19%, the CEO's cash compensation would increase by 60%, and total compensation would go up by 40%, ceteris paribus. 22 However, such a calibration exercise must be interpreted with caution, since it extrapolates results based on local linearity assumptions that may not be valid globally.
The results in this section suggest that the compensation of geographically-proximate
CEOs is an important determinant of CEO pay.
Place Table 2 here
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The effect of geography on compensation is puzzling from the standpoint of optimal contracting theory. This theory suggests that the CEO's compensation should depend on his reservation utility, his disutility for effort, his risk aversion, the risk in the payoff (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979) , and possibly his perceived ability (e.g., Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986). Geography has no role to play. In this section, I perform a variety of robustness checks to see if the surprising effect of geography on CEO compensation goes away when additional variables are introduced as controls or when alternative specifications are used.
Effect of firm age
The first robustness check is to see if the results documented thus far may be driven by firm age.
Younger firms are likely to have more recent relationships with venture capital (VC) firms and are more likely to be run by their founders. Thus, their compensation practices may differ from those of more established firms run by non-founder professional managers who are also distant from VCs. If coincidentally younger firms tend to cluster geographically (e.g., Silicon Valley), then the effect of geography on executive compensation would be illusory. To check this, I introduce firm age as a control variable. I calculate firm age as the number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP. salary, cash compensation, and total compensation.
The coefficient on firm age is positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting that compensation is significantly higher at older firms. The coefficients on the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs remain positive and significant at the 1% level in all cases, while the coefficients on total compensation are positive and significant at the 5% -10% level. This evidence suggests that differences in firm age cannot explain the persistent effect of geography on CEO compensation.
Place Table 3 here
Governance: Monitoring by Directors
In the main specification, I only use CEO tenure to control for differences in corporate governance across firms. The existing literature, however, has found that a variety of governance proxies may affect CEO compensation, which raises the possibility of omitted corporate governance variables driving the results. One aspect of governance that may be particularly relevant is monitoring by directors. Such monitoring may be more effective when the board is composed of more outside directors, i.e. board members who are not current executives, retired executives, or the family of present or past management. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the papers in this literature tend to find a positive relation between CEO compensation and the fraction of outside directors (e.g., Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1993; and Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) . The effect of director monitoring may also be related to board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996) . Board size has been found to be positively related with CEO pay (e.g., Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999).
To examine the possibility of the results being driven by differences in board composition and board size across firms, these two variables are added as control variables to the regressions.
The number of outside directors and board size are obtained from The Corporate Library's directorships database. 23 The fraction of outside directors is calculated as the number of outsiders divided by the total number of directors. salary, cash compensation, and total compensation.
Consistent with the existing literature, the fraction of outside directors and board size have a positive (albeit not always significant) effect on CEO pay. Importantly, however, the coefficients on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs remain positive and highly significant based on salary and cash compensation.
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Place Table 4 here
Governance: Shareholder Rights and Leverage
Besides board monitoring, other aspects of governance could also potentially drive my results.
Gabaix and Landier (forthcoming) examine the effect of shareholder rights on CEO pay. They use the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick ("GIM") (2003) governance index, which focuses on provisions and firm-level rules that restrict shareholder rights or increase managerial power, for this purpose.
They find that poor governance (higher GIM) significantly increases CEO compensation.
Leverage may matter as well. First, debtholders provide monitoring services that differ from those provided by shareholders. Their mere presence may affect CEO compensation.
Second, debt is a "hard claim" that disciplines management (Hart, 1993; and Hart and Moore, 1995) . This effect too may influence CEO compensation. Third, when leverage increases, the agency costs of debt go up ceteris paribus. John and John (1993) predict that optimal CEO compensation has pay-for-performance sensitivity that is decreasing in leverage because this diminishes the CEO's incentive to act solely in the shareholders' interest and expropriate wealth from the bondholders. Pay-for-performance sensitivity affects the CEO's compensation risk and thus leverage may also affect the level of compensation. To examine the possibility that shareholder rights or leverage explain my results, the GIM index and leverage, defined as the debtto-asset ratio as of the previous fiscal year-end, are added to the regressions. Table 5 contains the results. In Panels A and B, geographic closeness is again measured as firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer and a 250-kilometer radius, respectively. Consistent with existing evidence, the coefficients on the GIM index tend to be positive and significant, suggesting that CEO compensation is higher when shareholder rights are poorer (higher GIM).
The coefficients on leverage are positive and significant in four out of six cases. 25 However, the coefficients on the compensation of geographically-close CEOs continue to be positive and significant in all but one case.
Place Table 5 here
Adding State Fixed Effects and Using Firm Fixed Effects
The regressions so far included year and industry fixed effects to deal with unobserved time and industry heterogeneity. It is possible, however, that there are regional differences in compensation as well. That is, social norms may affect CEO compensation and these may differ across regions.
For example, CEOs in the Midwest may be paid systematically differently compared to CEOs in the South. To address this, I rerun the regressions and add state fixed effects. Table 6 Panel I contains the regression results. In subpanels I-A and I-B, geographic proximity is measured as firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer and a 250-kilometer radius, respectively. The coefficients on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs remain highly significant using a 100-kilometer radius, and are also significant based on salary and cash compensation using a 250-kilometer radius.
Consistent with the literature on the level of CEO compensation (e.g., Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Milbourn, 2003; and Gabaix and Landier, forthcoming) , I have included year and industry fixed effects. However, my sample includes multiple observations per firm, which suggests that the t-statistics may be somewhat overstated. To mitigate this issue, I rerun the regressions including firm fixed effects.
26 25 Because there is no existing theory that directly links leverage to the level of CEO compensation, it is difficult to say whether the sign of the coefficient on leverage is what we should expect. One possible way to understand what I find is that leverage increases the risk of bankruptcy and hence the probability that the CEO's tenure with the firm will be terminated, so the CEO is compensated for that risk through higher compensation (e.g., Jaggia and Thakor,1994) . 26 The use of firm fixed effects led me to drop the industry fixed effects from the regressions. Table 6 Panel II contains the results. In subpanels II-A and II-B, geographic closeness is measured using the usual distance cutoffs (100-kilometer and 250-kilometer radius). Using firm fixed effects rather than industry fixed effects, the coefficients on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs are smaller than before, but the t-statistics indicate that the results remain statistically significant at the 5% level based on salary and cash compensation (in all cases) and at the 10% level based on total compensation (in one out of two cases).
Place Table 6 here
Specification in Logs
Consistent with the approach in Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) , Faulkender and Yang (2007) and Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) , the regression results presented so far were obtained using untransformed data. The dollar amount of CEO compensation was regressed on the average dollar amount of compensation earned by geographically-close CEOs plus control variables thatwhere appropriate -were also expressed in levels (industry-peer compensation, firm size, per capita income and cost of living). An alternative would be to estimate the regressions using log transformations. Amacon (1975) , for example, shows that guide charts used by human-resource specialists to set compensation levels are obtained by regressing the logarithm of compensation on the logarithm of firm size. To examine whether using a log-transformed specification alters my findings, I rerun the regressions using log(compensation), log(average compensation of geographically-close CEOs), log(average compensation at similar-sized industry peers), log(firm size), log(per capita income) and log(cost of living). Table 7 contains the results of this log-transformed specification. As before, in Panels A and B, geographic closeness is measured as firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer and a 250-kilometer radius, respectively. Each panel contains three columns showing the results based on the three compensation measures: salary, cash compensation, and total compensation.
All the coefficients on the logarithm of the average compensation of geographically-close
CEOs are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The coefficient on the average salary of geographically-proximate CEOs of 0.115 presented in the first column of Panel A suggests that, ceteris paribus, when the salaries of geographically-close CEOs increase by 10%, CEO salary goes up by over 1%. This effect of geography equals roughly half of the effect the average compensation of CEOs at similar-sized industry peers has on CEO compensation, a sizeable effect.
Importantly, the effect of geography on CEO compensation persists even when logtransformed variables are used.
Place Table 7 here
Evidence from One Industry: Electric Utilities
Consistent with the existing literature, the results presented so far include industry fixed effects (with the exception of a robustness check in Section 5.4). However, the validity of using industry fixed effects hinges on two critical assumptions: where a firm locates its headquarters is not an endogenous choice, and within each industry different technologies adopted by firms do not imply different optimal locations (see Hong, Kubik and Stein, forthcoming). These two assumptions may not be met in the preceding analysis. For example, a firm that relies heavily on the human capital of computer experts may be more likely to locate in Silicon Valley, and a firm that uses land-intensive technologies may choose a location with cheap real estate. To ensure that these factors do not drive the results, I rerun the main regressions using a subsample of electric utilities (SIC codes 4911 and 4931), as suggested by Hong, Kubik and Stein (forthcoming). Production technologies employed by utilities are relatively homogeneous in different parts of the U.S. and high transportation costs in this industry tend to minimize the endogenous location-selection effect. All of the previously-used control variables are included in the regressions, except that the average compensation at similar-sized industry peers is now based on electric utilities only. As before, the CEO's own compensation is excluded from the industry average. Table 8 contains the results. In Panels A and B, geographic closeness is again measured as firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer and a 250-kilometer radius, respectively. When compensation is defined as salary or cash compensation, the coefficients on compensation are positive and significant in all cases. It is not surprising that the coefficients based on total compensation are positive but only significant in one out of two cases, since CEO stock and option plans are less prevalent in this industry.
It is actually remarkable to detect signs of a geographic component in CEO pay at electric utilities. These firms operate in a highly-regulated industry and CEO compensation is (partially) regulated as well. Thus, finding generally consistent results based on restricting the sample to electric utilities reinforces the main findings.
Place Table 8 here
Exclude New York and California
To ameliorate concerns that New York and California, whose compensation practices may differ from those in other states, are exercising a disproportionate influence on the results, the regressions are rerun using a sample that excludes these two states. Table 9 contains the results. The coefficients on the compensation variables tend to be somewhat smaller than those shown in Table 2 . However, the coefficients on salary and cash compensation continue to be positive and significant at the 1% level. Coefficients are not significant based on total compensation. Thus, the inclusion of New York and California does not seem to drive the main results.
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Summary of Findings
In this section, various robustness checks were performed to examine whether the surprising effect of geography on CEO compensation goes away after introducing additional control variables or using alternative specifications. While the results based on total compensation continued to be significant in roughly half the cases, the results based on salary and cash compensation were shown to remain significant in all cases, generally at the 1% level.
In the remainder of this paper, results based on total compensation are therefore merely shown for completeness. The discussion will focus on salary and cash compensation.
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
27 Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar when New Jersey is also excluded.
In this section, I attempt to empirically distinguish between three potential drivers of the result that the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs has a significant impact on CEO compensation: local competition for talent, a leading firm effect, and relativeconsumption preferences.
Local Competition for CEOs Effect?
One possibility is that the results are driven by the effect of local labor market competition for CEOs. Such competition would tend to raise the compensation of all CEOs in an area in which the labor market is tight and lower it in an area in which the labor supply is ample, which would lead to geographic clustering of compensation (e.g., Vietorisz and Harrison, 1973; and Kennan and Walker, 2008) . 28 Given that the ExecuComp database includes only relatively large, listed companies, it seems unlikely that local labor market competition for CEOs is driving the results, since one may expect the force of such competition at these firms to be relevant only for the compensation of lower-level employees. Nonetheless, this issue is now examined.
For this examination, I limit the sample to the largest and most prominent companies in the U.S., those that were part of the S&P 500 in the previous year. The labor market for the CEOs at these firms should be global or national rather than local, and their compensation should therefore not exhibit geographic clustering due to local labor market competition. That is, if the results are driven by this local competition for talent effect, the coefficients on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs should be smaller than those presented in Table 2 and not significant using this restricted sample. Contrary to what the local-competition-for-CEOs effect predicts, the coefficients on the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs tend to be bigger than before and continue to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that even at the largest and most prominent firms, for which CEO labor markets should be global or national and compensation should be unaffected by local labor market conditions, geography affects CEO compensation. Thus, the link between geography and CEO compensation does not seem to be driven entirely by local labor market competition for CEOs.
Place Table 10 here
Leading Firm Effect?
The leading firm effect is suggested by the literature on social interaction which proposes that agents may be influenced by others (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) . Initially, a few leading agents adopt a practice, and subsequent social interaction with these leaders causes others to adopt the practice as well. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) argue that not all agents are equal: some agents influence their neighbors but cannot themselves be influenced. Kedia and Rajgopal (forthcoming) use this insight to examine whether the existence of leading firms can explain observed geographic differences in option grants. 29 In the context of this paper, the social interaction effect suggests that leading firms determine the compensation levels for their CEOs and geographically-proximate firms follow suit, generating the link between geography and executive compensation that I find. This possibility is now examined.
As a first test, the base regressions are rerun while limiting the sample to leading firms.
That is, I ask: is the compensation of CEO i in a leading firm influenced by the average compensation of CEOs at other firms in the geographic vicinity? If my results are driven by leading firms, the coefficients on the compensation of geographically-close CEOs should now be insignificant since leading firms -by assumption -cannot be influenced. Leading firms are defined here as the top three firms within a 100-kilometer radius based on sales or market value of equity in the previous year (e.g., Kedia and Rajgopal, forthcoming). Firms that act as leading firms to any firm in the main sample are kept in the leading firm sample. As a second test, the base regressions from Table 2 are rerun, but in computing the average compensation of CEOs within a 100-kilometer radius, attention is limited to just the CEO compensation at the leading (top three) firms. These leading firms are subsequently excluded from the regressions. If the compensation at geographically-close leading firms (rather than all geographically-close firms) is driving the results, the coefficients on these alternative average CEO compensation measures should be larger than those presented in Table 2 and more significant. Table 11 Panels B1 and B2 present the results, identifying firms as leading firms based on sales and market value of equity, respectively. The coefficients on the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs employed at top three firms are positive and significant at the 1% level. However, contrary to what the leading-firm effect predicts, the coefficients are tiny compared to those presented in Table 2 and the t-statistics are smaller.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that my findings are not driven by a leading-firm effect.
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Explanation Based on Relative Consumption Preferences
In this section, I examine whether relative status concerns or envy can explain why geography affects CEO compensation. Since reference groups for CEO envy are composed of CEOs at similar-sized firms, firms in the same industry, and those in the vicinity, I use controls for CEO compensation at similar-sized industry peers in order to delineate the effect of geography.
A strong implication of the envy hypothesis is that the effect of relative status concerns will be bigger the further the CEO's pay lies below the average compensation of geographicallyclose CEOs and smaller the further his pay lies above the average. 30 That is, the effect of envy 30 The effect of envy is not limited to those who earn less than the average. The following quote from The New York Times ("In web world, rich now envy the superrich", Nov. 21, 2006) supports this view: "Almost anywhere else, Reid Hoffman would be considered a major success. As an early executive of PayPal, he was in the money when the company was sold to eBay in 2002 for $1.5 billion. These days, he runs a new start-up company of his own while will be increasing in the difference between the average compensation of geographically- Note that this result cannot be explained away as a mere "economic reversion to the mean" effect. The results do suggest that the CEO is catching up with the mean wage of CEOs in the investing in others. But when greater fortunes are made -as happened recently to three former PayPal colleagues when YouTube was sold to Google for $1.65 billion -Mr. Hoffman said he could not avoid a twinge of envy. "It's kind of embarrassing," said Mr. Hoffman, 39, whose start-up, a business-oriented social-networking site called LinkedIn, is almost four years old. "You started a year or two earlier, and they start after you and then this thing zips right past you and gets the golden results. Envy may be a sin in some books, but it is a powerful driving force in Silicon Valley, where technical achievements are admired but financial payoffs are the ultimate form of recognition." [..] Reference points only make matters worse, Mr. de Botton said. He pointed to research that has been done on attractive women who feel ugly when surrounded by images of more beautiful women. "Very often the problem isn't so much what an individual happens to look like, but the extraordinary comparisons being made," he said." 31 Results are qualitatively similar if only firm size and profitability are replaced. 32 Since envy reference groups also include CEOs of similar-sized firms in the same industry, the coefficient on the compensation gap between similar-sized industry peers and the CEO is also predicted to be positive. However, this effect is difficult to disentangle from a mere "catching up with the mean" story, since compensation specialists focus explicitly on CEO pay at similar-sized firms in the same industry when setting CEO compensation (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, forthcoming).
neighborhood, but it is a mean that should be irrelevant according to standard optimal contracting theory. Thus, the evidence presented in this section suggests that envy may drive my finding that geography affects CEO compensation.
Place Table 12 here
Explanation Based on Relative-Consumption Preferences -Instrumental Variable

Regressions
This section examines the robustness of the conclusion that relative status concerns or envy drive the documented geographic clustering of CEO compensation. Two potential concerns are addressed. The first is a possible omitted variable bias. Even though the OLS regressions control for a variety of previously-documented factors that affect CEO compensation, such as CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, industry, and corporate governance, one cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that an omitted variable unrelated to either geography or relative-consumption concerns is causing the compensation of all CEOs in a given geography to be similar. The second concern is endogeneity. Although I hypothesize that the compensation of CEO i (dependent variable) is driven by the average compensation of all CEOs in the area (independent variable), the causality may be reversed. After all, CEO compensation is based on the benchmarking data of other CEOs.
Of course, compensation benchmarking is normally based on firm size and industry (factors controlled for in the regressions), not geography, so the strong effect of envy working through geography that is documented here cannot be waved away based on just compensation benchmarking. Moreover, in all the regressions presented in this paper, the independent variable is lagged to deal with potential endogeneity concerns. And at a more fundamental level, to the extent that relative consumption concerns of geographically-close CEOs cause them to receive higher levels of compensation because CEO i had a high compensation (reverse causality), the main argument is unaffected. In the first-stage regressions, the average cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs is regressed on all the exogenous variables plus the instrument, the average cash compensation of geographically-close professional sports players. I find that the coefficient on the instrument is positive and significant at the 1% level based on all four sports. In the second-stage regression, CEO compensation is regressed on the fitted or predicted values of the average cash compensation of geographically-close sports players plus all other exogenous variables. Table 13 shows the second-stage instrumental variable regressions. The results are similar to my main findings -the coefficient on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs (instrumented) is positive and significant based on MLB data, the only sports league for which 33 Similar results are obtained if the compensation of sports players is used as an instrument for CEO salary (rather than cash compensation). data are available for all years. The coefficient on the average compensation is also positive and significant in two out of the three remaining specifications. Thus, the instrumental variable analysis confirms the main result that envy appears to be the channel through with the compensation of geographically-proximate CEOs affects the compensation of individual CEOs.
Place Table 13 here
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined whether CEO compensation depends on how much geographically-close CEOs earn. The documented results show that CEO compensation exhibits a strong geographical bias: CEO compensation (salary and cash compensation) is positively and significantly related to the level of compensation of CEOs employed at firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer or 250-kilometer radius. These results were obtained while controlling for other factors that have been found to affect CEO compensation, including CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, growth options, firm performance, year and industry fixed effects. All regressions also included the average compensation of similar-sized firms in the same industry. Proxies for local market conditions were included to ensure that the results are not driven by differences in per capita income or the cost of living. The results are robust to using a variety of alternative specifications, including: the addition of corporate governance proxies; excluding New York and California from the sample; limiting the sample to electric utilities; the use of log-transformed variables; and the use of state or firm fixed effects. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
Three potential explanations for this effect were examined. First, it may be that the results are driven by the effect of local labor market competition for CEOs, which would tend to raise the compensation of all CEOs in the area when the local labor market is tight and lower it when the labor supply is ample. I find that this effect cannot explain the results. Second, it is possible that CEO compensation reflects the social-interaction effect proposed by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) , which would predict that CEO compensation is influenced by compensation policies at leading firms (rather than all firms) in the vicinity. Specific empirical tests to check this as a possible cause of the effect of geography indicate that this "leading-firm effect" cannot explain my findings. Third, it is possible that CEOs exhibit envy, and their concern with the compensation of geographically-proximate CEOs in their reference group could lead to geographical clustering of CEO pay. The empirical evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. The robustness of this conclusion to omitted variable and endogeneity concerns is verified using instrumental variable (IV) regressions in which the average cash compensation of geographically-close CEOs is instrumented by the average cash compensation of professional sports players (MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL) within a 100-kilometer radius. Results from the IV regressions confirm the results of the OLS regressions.
The results from this paper add to a growing literature that finds that CEO characteristics affect corporate policies. While the focus in the literature has largely been on CEO overconfidence and CEO optimism, this paper is part of a small but growing literature which shows empirically that relative-consumption preferences may also influence corporate policies. Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants.
The CEO's own compensation is not included in the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and the average industry compensation. The average compensation of geographically-close CEOs is calculated using the previous year's CEO compensation at firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer or a 250-kilometer radius. Average industry compensation is the average compensation of CEOs at similar-sized firms (i.e. in the same total assets tercile) in the same industry in the previous year.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. This table reports the results of regressing CEO compensation on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and control variables. Two director monitoring proxies have been added as control variables to allow for the possibility that compensation levels are affected by the level of director monitoring. The results show that the average salary and cash compensation of geographically-proximate CEOs has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation even after controlling for director monitoring.
Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Per capita income is from the 2000 decennial census. Cost of living (the ACCRA Cost of Living Index) is from the Council for Community and Economic Research. Fraction of outside directors is the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Board size is the total number of directors. Time and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Industries correspond to the 17 Fama-French industry groupings.
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
CEO total compensation
Compensation variables based on salary, cash compensation or total compensation depending on the This table reports the results of regressing CEO compensation on the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and control variables. A shareholder rights proxy and leverage have been added as control variables to allow for the possibility that compensation levels are affected by these two variables. The results show that the average compensation of geographically-proximate CEOs has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation even after controlling for shareholder rights and leverage.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Per capita income is from the 2000 decennial census. Cost of living (the ACCRA Cost of Living Index) is from the Council for Community and Economic Research. GIM index is the Gompers Ishii Metric shareholder rights index. Leverage ratio is debt divided by total assets. Time and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Industries correspond to the 17 Fama-French industry groupings.
Compensation variables based on salary, cash compensation or total compensation depending on the Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. The results show that using this log-transformed specification, the average compensation of geographically-proximate CEOs again has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. This table examines whether local labor market competition for CEOs can explain the main results. The sample is restricted to companies that were part of the S&P500 in the previous year since the market for the CEOs at these firms should be global or national rather than local. The results are similar to those reported before, suggesting that local labor market competition for CEOs does not drive the results.
CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Per capita income is from the 2000 decennial census. Cost of living (the ACCRA Cost of Living Index) is from the Council for Community and Economic Research. Time and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Industries correspond to the 17 Fama-French industry groupings.
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants.
The CEO's own compensation is not included in the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and the average industry compensation. The average compensation of geographically-close CEOs is calculated using the previous year's CEO compensation at firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer radius. Average industry compensation is the average compensation of CEOs at similar-sized firms (i.e. in the same total assets tercile) in the same industry in the previous year.
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table examines whether relative consumption preferences among CEOs can explain the main results. The percentage change in CEO compensation is regressed on the CEO's "percentage compensation gap," the difference between the compensation of geographicallyclose CEOs and the CEO's own compensation expressed as a percentage of the CEO's own compensation, plus control variables. The effect of relative status concerns will tend to be bigger the further the CEO's pay lies below the average compensation of geographicallyclose CEOs and smaller the further his pay lies above the average. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that relative status concerns drive the effect of geography on CEO pay. Compensation measures: Salary measures the compensation part that is fixed (non-contingent) at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, stock and option grants. % compensation gap is the difference between the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and the CEO's compensation, both as of the previous year. The average compensation of geographically-close CEOs is calculated using the previous year's CEO compensation at firms headquartered within a 100-kilometer or a 250-kilometer radius. % compensation gap between industry and the CEO is the difference between the average industry compensation and the CEO's compensation, both as of the previous year. Average industry compensation is the average compensation of CEOs at similar-sized firms (i.e. in the same total assets tercile) in the same industry in the previous year. The CEO's own compensation is not included in the average compensation of geographically-close CEOs and the average industry compensation. CEO age is the CEO's age. CEO tenure is the number of years the executive has been the firm's CEO. Firm size is measured as total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. M/B ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. Stock returns are the average monthly stock returns over the prior fiscal year. Profitability is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end. Per capita income is from the 2000 decennial census. Cost of living (the ACCRA Cost of Living Index) is from the Council for Community and Economic Research. Time and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Industries correspond to the 17 Fama-French industry groupings. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
